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tude to Professor Hall for the review he has made of what has been done
to date and for his proposals as to what should be the goal for comparatists in the future. We can share with him his final admonition that a
scholar's work increases as he comes more fully to understand his role in
a large enterprise of importance, although the creative tasks of scholarship remain individual ones. 9 If the individual can come to believe that
his attention to detail is but a part of an effort of multitudes to understand the behavior of mankind, and thereby to provide in some presently
unforeseeable way for man's triumph over forces of destruction, he will
face his inevitable moments of exhaustion and discouragement with composure, or what the public used to call, "philosophically."
jOEN N. HAZARDt

MISTAKE AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT.

By George E. Palmer. Co-

lumbus: Ohio State University Press. 1962.

Pp. 114. $3.75.

One should not expect this book to be a best seller. Except for what
I think is a modernistic jacket design, Mistake and Uqust Enrichment is
a decidedly old-fashioned book. Nothing has happened in recent years
to cause any new anxiety about the subject matter; interdisciplinary significance is lacking; and the author has not availed himself of symbolic
logic or electro-magnetic assistance. Instead, he has done the rather
tedious job of analyzing, synthesizing and criticizing appellate case material in a private law area distinguished by a long history of classificatory
chaos.
The mess which one finds in the general area of Restitution has been
documented by others. In his Restitution casebook, Dean Wade reports
that the General Digest user is without a "rubric" and must consult over
25 key numbers to get at the relevant cases.' But there is some hope according to two authors who, in remarkably similar passages, suggest that
something or someone is beginning to bring order out of chaos.2 Cer19. P. 124.
t
1.

Professor of Public Law, Columbia University.
WADE,CASES AND MATERIALS ON RESTITUTION 37 (1958).

2. "The remedies aimed at restitution of unjust enrichment have grown like

Topsy.

They could be better described as a diversified litter of Topsies, with a common parentage that was only recently discovered." Dawson, Restitution or Damages?, 20 Onio
ST. L.J. 175 (1959).
"The subject of Restitution never really grew or developed. Rather, it has been
like dim fragments moving amongst the bright stars of the curricular firmament,
sweeping up cosmic dust and the shattered pieces of other bodies as they disintegrated,
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tainly the law school curriculum has done its best to compound the confusion by scattering among the courses in Contracts, Equity, Remedies
and Restitution, the muddled mixture of unilateral and mutual mistake,
mistake as to substance, mistake as to value, rescission, reformation, cancellation, restitution, money had and received, quasi contract, minds didn't
meet, objective theory, etc.
Since Professor Palmer's classification thesis and discussion are
brief and tightly drawn, a summarization would be inadequate. A few
samples of his treatment must therefore suffice. With one exception
(mistake in performance), he stays with traditional categories of mistake: mistake of misunderstanding, mistake in basic assumptions, and
mistake in integration. He does insist on a number of "distinctions" and
"interacting factors." He suggests that some of our confusion in the
misunderstanding category stems from an unnecessary doctrinal logic.
Where an inaccurate or imprecise description of property causes a buyer
to "mistakenly" accept a seller's offer, traditional contract doctrine gives
relief to the buyer on the theory that no contract ever came into existence.
Where, however, the property is accurately described and the buyer still
accepts in the mistaken idea that he is buying other property, the objective theory is applied, a valid contract is found, and the mistake is denied
legal significance. Professor Palmer argues that this logic distracts attention "from the inescapable problems of justice.

.

.

.

[I] f the lot

owned by the vendor and described in a written contract were worth only
half the agreed price, whereas the lot the purchaser thought he was getting
was worth the full price, the question that should be faced is whether it
is fair to hold the purchaser to his agreement. There is a better way to
decide this than through a shifting formulation of contract theory." 3
Most of the author's discussion centers on the "mistake in basic assumptions," a mistake of the party or parties which concerns some matter
relevant to the decision to enter into a contract. In the inevitable clash
between the policies of finality of transactions and the just result in the
particular case, the author discards the traditional "mistake as to substance" and "mistake as to quality" tests. Instead, he suggests two
decision-influencing, interacting factors. The first concerns the relation
between the mistake and the terms of the contract. The chance of upsetting the contract increases as the error approaches the terms and decreases as it moves away from the terms and into the context. Thus in
until the conglomeration began to incandesce and appear on the star charts of academic
searchers of the heavens." York, BooK REVIEV, 11 J. LEGAL ED. 425 (1959).

3. P. 12.
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the English case of Scott v. Coulson, the seller of a life insurance policy
was successful in setting aside the sale on the ground that neither he nor
the buyer knew that the person whose life was insured was dead at the
time of the sale. The price had been fixed with reference to the surrender value of the policy which was slightly more than one-half the
amount of the face value. The English describe the result as dictated by
a "mistake in existence or identity." Professor Palmer terms this a metaphysical test. He would prefer to say that the mistake relates to a matter
which is objectively basic since the terms of the contract make it evident
that the insured's existence or non-existence was a highly relevant fact.'
The second decision-influencing factor is the unjust enrichment element-a theme which runs throughout the book. Although Professor
Palmer recognizes that freedom of contract includes the freedom to agree
to an unequal exchange, he argues that this policy is only compelling
when the inequality is understood and consciously built into the bargain.
The reasons that justify enforcement of contract are much diluted when
the inequality "is not contemplated by the parties or at least by the one
who was hurt."' But doesn't the "or" clause contain the rub? If the
inequitable exchange can be upset whenever the aggrieved party is mistaken, will we not find almost as many mistaken claimants as inequitable
exchanges?
For those who have had difficulty in reconciling the divergent results in the sale of land with undiscovered oil and the sale of a cow with
an undiscovered calf, the author's analysis will be helpful.7 His trenchant
comments on the risk analysis8 and the old distinction between unilateral
and mutual mistake' should be hidden from first year law students and
used exclusively for the edification of the instructor. And this suggests
an unintended by-product. The author's material constitutes a bonanza
for the instructor in Legal Method who conducts an annual search for
problem material. If he can successfully hide this book, the cases cited
and discussed will serve as ideal raw material for sharpening the first
year skills of analysis and synthesis. Professor Palmer is to be specially
commended for the dispatch with which he has accomplished his mission.
In 97 small-sized pages of text he has illumined one of the dark comers
ALFRED W.
MEYER"
of the common law.
4.

[1903] 2 Ch. 249, Affirming [1903] 1 Ch. 453, cited pp. 33-36.

5. P. 47.
6. P. 38.

Pp. 15, 51.
Pp. 53-58.
Pp. 67-90.
t Associate Professor of Law, Valparaiso University.
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